



HELLENIC LINK–MIDWEST Newsletter


A CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC LINK WITH GREECE

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Upcoming Events

Recent Advances in Cancer Research and Therapeutic Approaches

On Sunday April 29, 2018, Hellenic Link–Midwest presents Professor Leonidas C. Platanius in a lecture titled: *“Recent Advances in Cancer Research and Therapeutic Approaches.”* The event will be held at 3:00 pm in Room 1610, at the Oakton Community College, 1600 E. Golf Road, Des Plaines, IL 60016. Admission is free.

In recent years there have been significant advances in the treatment of cancer patients using immune therapies, while the use of big data is facilitating new important breakthroughs in cancer research. This lecture will review research efforts and advances in the treatment of cancer, based on cutting edge research conducted at the Lurie Cancer Center of Northwestern University.

Leonidas C. Platanius, MD, PhD, is the Jesse, Sara, Andrew, Abigail, Benjamin and Elizabeth Lurie Professor of Oncology, and Director of the Robert H. Lurie Comprehensive Cancer Center of Northwestern University. His leadership has advanced the growth and expansion of the Lurie Cancer Center’s clinical and research operations, and has strengthened the Lurie Cancer Center’s standing of international prominence. Dr. Platanius research is focused on molecular biology and biochemistry research; concentrating on signaling pathways in cancer cells and developing novel treatments for malignancies by targeting such pathways. Dr. Platanius received numerous awards, grants and contracts for his research work and has published over 300 scientific papers. Among his many career honors, Dr. Platanius received the 2013 Seymour & Vivian Milstein Award for Excellence in Cytokine Research that represents the pinnacle of scientific achievement in cytokine and interferon research. He has served as President of the International Cytokine and Interferon Society (ICIS) in 2010-2011.

Short-Circuiting Democracy and the Constitution

On Sunday, May 20, 2018, Hellenic Link–Midwest, presents Prof. Nicholas Stephanopoulos in a presentation titled *“Short-Circuiting Democracy and the Constitution”*. The event will be held at 3:00 pm at the

Hyatt Rosemont hotel, 6350 N. River Road, Rosemont, Illinois. Admission is free for HLM members and students with ID, and \$5 for non-members.

Professor Stephanopoulos will discuss a number of current critical issues challenging American Democracy and the interpretation of the Constitution. These include: the manipulation of election outcomes by manipulating the boundaries of electoral districts (gerrymandering); freedom of speech and the role of money in politics; the role of the Supreme Court as materially extending or revising the constitution by a 5 to 4 majority that under a different court composition could have led to different outcome; the reversal of previous court decisions to fit the ideology of a new Court; the second amendment and gun violence; and the difficulty to amend the constitution in a way that reflects the “We the people...”

Nicholas Stephanopoulos is a professor of law at the University of Chicago. His research and teaching interests include election law, constitutional law, legislation, administrative law, comparative law, and local government law. He has been involved in several litigation efforts as well, including the first successful partisan gerrymandering lawsuit in more than thirty years. Before entering private practice, he clerked for Judge Raymond C. Fisher of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

He is a graduate of Yale Law School, and also holds an MPhil in European Studies from Cambridge University and an AB in government from Harvard College.

In Brief

Eurogroup Officer Speaks to Kathimerini

According to the outgoing Eurogroup Working Group chief Thomas Wiese, even though the current Greek bailout program expires in August 2018, like Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Cyprus, Greece will be under supervision until 75 percent of its debt is repaid, which, at current estimates, will be around 2060.

Was Brussels asleep at the wheel in 2009? I think that things were not acted upon much, much earlier. A colleague of mine in Vienna in 2007 or so said that he was very suspicious about the Greek economy, that *“there is a black hole”* in the Greek financial statistics, *“there is something that doesn’t add up.”* The next time I was in Brussels I spoke to the director-general of

ECOFIN, Marco Buti, and said, “*We think there is a black hole in the Greek statistics; maybe you should look into that,*” but nothing ever happened. That was 2007.

When the crisis began in 2009, it was a shock because in reality hardly anybody knew. The member-states never allowed us to look into their financial accounts. It was only over the course of the crisis that the rules changed.

Why did it take the Europeans so long to act? We were totally unprepared for this. The whole architecture of the monetary union, the Maastricht Treaty was built on an assumption which turned out to be wrong: that there could be no destabilizing current account deficit in a monetary union; that capital markets could not dry up. All of that happened. No policies were in place, and the treaty architecture more or less forbade us to do what we had to do. We had to invent things in a couple of years in the midst of a crisis. The monetary union as it was built in the 90s was incomplete and it could be destabilized by shocks such as those we had in Greece, Portugal, Cyprus and Spain. Before the crisis, there was the strong belief that these things won’t happen.

On the root of the Greek crisis: First and foremost there is a governance issue. Segmented groups of society, on both sides of the political spectrum, enterprises and trade unions, have simply carved up the economy into very cushy jobs. Those who are not inside this comfortable cocoon find it very difficult to defend themselves, be they enterprises or citizens. People felt inclined to hire thousands of people at state-owned enterprises where they don’t need them – it was a business model. You can only retain this model if you try to close your economy to foreign competition, since foreign competition is very bad to such a business model. That in turn makes the economy less and less competitive.

Greece is not yet completely past that point. There are established interests. The more meritocratic a society is, the easier it is to overcome these dangers.

Greeks have lost 25 percent of their income: In 2009 Greece was pumping more than 15 percent of GDP as deficit. If one believes that government spending has an effect on the level of economy then you must wonder what the level of income and GDP in Greece would have been if the Greek government had pursued a more sane, sustainable fiscal policy.

On the design of the bailout programs: A good and responsible government thinks of the long term. And in the very long term you need to fix institutions and build up a meritocratic society. Greece was always antagonistic. The institutions and the member-states were always seen as the “xenos,” not as somebody to solve the problem together with. Because of that very antagonistic attitude, lots of things never got done as agreed; that’s why it became so micro-economic and evasive. We did that much less in other countries.

What was your biggest mistake? I should have realized much earlier the degree to which a debt restructuring for Greece was necessary, at the beginning of the first program. If we had a debt restructuring and more cooperative Greek counterparts, then many, many things would have been different. We had to learn the hard way.

On the reaction of the Greeks to the bailout: It was a strong feeling compared to other countries. There was no realization in the political class of what the problem was and it would appear saying that it was the fault of others. And if you look at any other country that had a program, there was a very strong process domestically, essentially saying what we did wrong. Greece is the only country where this process never happened and where there is a strong story line that it’s everybody else’s fault, especially the foreigner.

In June 2012 Merkel had still not decided if Greece should remain in the Eurozone: There were a few conversations in mid-autumn 2012 which I think convinced major players that one should give another try with Greece in the euro area. I cannot say what everybody was thinking, but my impression is that for some people the negative impacts of Greece leaving the euro area played an important role.

Samaras were told in November 2012 that if he achieved a primary surplus he would be given debt relief. Why did this not happen? The debt relief in 2014, if I remember correctly, was agreed to go ahead at the first review after a primary surplus had been reached. But as the Samaras government was not willing to conclude a review there was no debt relief. That is my recollection.

On the rising of SYRIZA: That’s where the politics of other member-states comes in. The Germans, Finns, Dutch, Slovaks and others had a feeling that the program has a certain volume, end date and certain conditions – and that if it’s over, it’s over. The Greek government was not doing the reforms under the program agreed because of upcoming elections, and everyone vastly preferred not to have a new program. What we went through in 2015, with extension after extension, it was a joke. I don’t think the Greek government had any intention to do more in the extension period of extension than before. They were wasting our time.

Why do you say that? Because one of the leaders of the government said this was their intention: to waste time so we would give the money anyway without doing anything. I told him, “*Stop dreaming.*”

On Varoufakis: I think that everybody felt the change the first five minutes that Euclid Tsakalotos talked to the Eurogroup. The difference was that with Euclid, one could find a solution. He was not looking for a pulpit to grandstand.

On the U.S. involvement: It was by far stronger than in any other program and I think that the Americans have

been extremely knowledgeable and very helpful. Mainly in not being dogmatic but trying to push for a solution that was good for Greece and the eurozone as well. They obviously had very strong interests not because of the pure economics but because of geopolitical factors, which is an issue that has to be reminded to all of us as well, as Europeans. They called everybody constantly. They were totally in the loop.

On foreign investment: I still have the feeling that foreign direct investment is not welcomed in Greece. And with the state of Greece being what it was in the last years, no rational investor who had the choice of investing did. Greece was considered too risky. An important issue is how certain can an investor be that he will get a fair and rapid legal procedure if he/she wants to access collateral, to get a rapid decision by an administrative entity, all of these things. We see huge differences in investment levels in countries where there is rapid and predictable legal proceeding versus other member-states where there is less rapid and predictable decision-making. This has a huge impact on investment levels, growth and employment.

On the justice system and education: I would agree that these issues matter most in the long run for the good development of the country. A high-class education system and a well-functioning judicial system are the cornerstones of an affluent and productive society, but this is the responsibility of a domestic government.

On implementation of actions: Elliniko is a very good example of why foreign investors are extremely doubtful of investing heavily in Greece across a variety of sectors and also shows how bureaucratic many administrative procedures are. Those are the true reforms that the country needs, cutting through all these processes.

What shocked you most when you started looking at Greece closer? The absence of meritocratic decisions. I have many examples but I won't tell you. I don't know if it has improved. Very many people with good intentions are around but again and again these very good intentions are thwarted by reality.

Did you feel at any point that Greece would leave the eurozone? Yes, after the summer 2015 referendum. I felt that it was over.

From Our History

Some of the Critical Developments that Led to the Division of Cyprus.

(Source: U.S. Consul General Charles W. McCaskill, July 7, 1993, Interview for Foreign Affairs Oral History Project)

The dysfunctional constitution imposed on Cyprus very soon led to a gridlock between the two communities. A disagreement developed on issues as the integrated Cypriot Army, quotas for the public service, tax legislation, separate municipalities, and communal

chambers.

In November 1963, to improve the functionality of the state, Cyprus' president, Archbishop Makarios, proposed thirteen amendments to the constitution. These would abolish: the right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic; the constitutional provisions regarding separate majority for enactment of Laws by the House of Representatives; the constitutional provision regarding Courts consisting of Greek Judges to try Greeks, of Turkish Judges to try Turks, and of mixed Courts consisting of Greek and Turkish Judges to try cases where the litigants are Greeks and Turks; the division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie. They provided: the numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Army to be determined by Law and not by agreement between the President and the Vice-President of the Republic; the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the Public Service and of the Police and the Army to be proportional to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots; and the decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority.

Turkey and the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community outrightly rejected the proposal, the Turkish Cypriot ministers withdrew from the Council of Ministers, and Turkish Cypriot civil servants ceased attending their offices.

McCASKILL: It bears mention that certainly in 1963, and maybe even earlier, Makarios thought he had UK support for constitutional reform. I myself accept that the Brits did indicate some support for reform, and must perforce accept some of the blame for the blow-up. As a foot note, this is documented in Clerides's book.

Q: Was his determination to revise the constitution supported by most of the Greek community that you talked to? Were there real problems, or were there perceived problems with the Turkish minority?

McCASKILL: While some Greek Cypriots may have been more moderate than others, all, deep in their hearts, felt that the Agreements were unfair and that the constitution needed revision. For all of its shortcomings, the London-Zurich Agreements could have worked with a modicum of good faith on both sides. I think, for example, if Makarios had given freely the 30% of the civil service to the Turkish Cypriots, if he had been more generous with the Turkish Cypriot community, it might have worked. The Turkish Cypriots were simply not up to partnership with the Greek Cypriots, and they would have been overwhelmed by the Greek Cypriots in the long term. But we must remember that Cyprus became independent 33 years ago. Who knows what might have evolved, peacefully, by now. I personally feel, as I may have said previously, that Cyprus would be a unitary state dominated by the majority Greek Cypriots.

The Turks were very aware of what London-Zurich had given them, and they would have opposed each Greek

encroachment strenuously. But I still feel, that over time, the Greek Cypriots would have had things their way.

Q: Did you have the feeling that the Greek Government in Athens was meddling in Cyprus's affairs?

McCASKILL: Athens was carefully trying to distance itself from Cyprus these early days after independence. The two Greek Ambassadors during that four years were highly able career men who were apparently under instructions to try to make London-Zurich work...When Makarios was hellbent on constitutional reform, then Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff wrote him a rather strong letter advising against such a move. Averoff himself told me once in Athens that those first three years of Cyprus's independence were "a real honeymoon" between Greece and Turkey. Averoff blamed Makarios for the blow-up, and made no effort to hide his resentment. The London-Zurich Agreements were concluded when Averoff was Foreign Minister - he had a personal stake in seeing them work.

Q: How did the blow-up happen?

McCASKILL: We had good information that both sides were arming, were forming paramilitary units to oppose the expected attacks of the other. This has also been confirmed by Glafkos Clerides, the present President of Cyprus, in his book entitled *My Deposition*. The Greeks had even begun patrols around the Turkish quarter of Nicosia. Apparently the Greek Cypriots had information that the Turks had received several shipments of rifles that they were going to distribute. Each side knew the other was arming and tension was escalating.

On the night of December 22, 1963, a Turkish Cypriot car with four Turkish Cypriots in it was returning to the Turkish quarter. They were actually in the red light district of Nicosia, a sort of no man's land between the two quarters, though in thinking about it I guess the red light district could not, per se, be a "no-man's land". Anyway, the Turks were stopped by a group of Greek Cypriot policemen and ordered out of the car. Shooting ensued—who knows who fired the first shot — two or three Turkish Cypriots were killed and a Greek Cypriot policeman was killed. That started it. We were having a party that night; it was the day before our wedding anniversary and we were having some friends from the Embassy in for dinner. We went ahead with the party despite the fact that the tension all over town was unlike anything I had ever experienced, an almost warlike-atmosphere all over town. Houses were shuttered up, traffic was at a minimum, there was a feeling that people were preparing for something.

The next day, a Sunday, December 23, dawned clear and tense. I will never forget the tension throughout town. Nobody moved. We had, to my knowledge, three overflights of two planes each by the Turkish Air Force in the period right around Christmas. In a Security Council meeting of December 26 or thereabouts, the Turks denied all but one of the overflights, and I believe

the Turkish Ambassador in Washington denied the reports when he was called in by Assistant Secretary Phil Talbot. The Department instructed us to be very careful in reporting overflights, but there was no doubt in the minds of many of us that overflights had occurred. Who else would be breaking the sound barrier over Nicosia in fighter planes with red markings?

Ambassador Wilkins and the Acting British High Commissioner, were very active in trying to work out a cease fire. The city had rapidly become divided, as the Turkish Cypriots withdrew into what was obviously a preconceived position in the northern part of Nicosia in the direction of Kyrenia on the north coast. Information available to us indicated that their emergency planning called for them to take the Kyrenia road to the pass in the Kyrenia mountains. Turkish relief for the Turkish Cypriots would come through the north and into Nicosia through the Kyrenia pass. That is in fact what happened in 1974 when the Turks invaded. The northern coast of Cyprus was only 40 miles from the Turkish mainland and that was the logical route for an invasion force.

But right away the city became divided, a sort of miniature Berlin. Sir Duncan Sandys, I believe Commonwealth Secretary at the time, came out to try to help keep the situation under control and cobble together a cease-fire. The Green Line, the line dividing the two communities, came into being when a British army officer engaged in the peace efforts drew a line on the map with a green crayon. The Green Line stands to this day, though it has undergone some changes in the 30 years since it was drawn. One time, Ambassador Wilkins was returning from the Turkish quarter where he had gone on official business, and he was stopped at a checkpoint and some young punk, a member of one of the paramilitary groups roaming the city, pointed a gun at the Ambassador's head. Ambassador Wilkins never confirmed that story to me, but I have always believed it. It gives a little of the atmosphere in the city at the time.

Q: Other than reporting were we playing any role?

McCASKILL: Of course. For example, there was a reported sighting of a Turkish flotilla off the northern coast of Cyprus. This could have provoked a reaction from the Greeks; it terrorized the people on the north coast, including some of our FBIS people. It was assumed of course that the Turks were headed toward Cyprus. The Embassy checked this out with Washington, which checked it with Ankara, and we were able to tell the Greeks and Greek Cypriots that it was only a "Turkish exercise"—it was gunboat diplomacy.

When we received that word, the Ambassador went to the Presidential Palace to inform Makarios. He could not find Makarios so delivered the message to some of his people there. When the Ambassador twitted Makarios about this later, the Archbishop said he figured that if the Turks were determined to invade, there was nothing he could do to stop it so he said his prayers and went to bed.